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Abstract 
Youth work is deemed to require a distinctive commitment to ethical behaviour from the              
adults involved. This is expressed in the requirements for the initial education of workers, in               
the subject benchmarks and national expectations for youth workers. A significant influence            
in this debate is Howard Sercombe (2010). Sercombe seeks a substantive framework for             
youth work ethics. The project offers clear potential benefits alongside equally great dangers.             
His platform is an integration of two foundations: a particular definition of youth work, and a                
particular account of what it means to be 'a profession'. I argue that both foundations are                
flawed, and potentially harmful to practice and policy. At the heart of Sercombe's account,              
however, is a focus on youth work as based on a 'covenantal relation of trust between youth                 
workers and young person'. This insight, submerged and marginalized, does offer a            
substantive foundation for youth work ethics. 
 
Introduction 
Youth work, informal education with young people, is deemed to be an activity that requires               
a distinctive commitment to particular ethical behaviour from the adults involved. This has             
long been an element of the requirements for the initial education of workers (NYA, 2010),               
the subject benchmarks (QAA, 2009), the UK national youth agencies’ expectations for youth             
workers’ conduct (NYA, 2004; CLD, 2011) and more recently as part of the agenda for the                
Institute of Youth Work (IYW, 2015). A significant influence in this debate has been the               
work of Howard Sercombe (Sercombe, 2010). Whilst earlier work in youth work ethics             
focused on identifying and exploring ethical issues (see Banks, 1999) or applying            
quasi-ethical, political frameworks (see, for example, Roberts, 2009 drawing on human           
rights), Sercombe sought to provide a substantive framework for ‘youth work ethics’. The             
approach offers clear potential benefits, however, in moving from the ad hoc resolution of              
practical ethical issues to a platform that informs and frames the ethical judgements of youth               
workers. Such potential benefits come with equally great dangers: an insecure, misplaced or             
fictitious platform risks undermining youth work practice and offering false assurance to            
workers on the ethical legitimacy of their actions.  
This paper focuses on the foundations of informal educators’ ethical judgements. Youth work             
is an essentially ethical activity concerned, as it is, with: 
‘Enabl[ing] young people to develop holistically, working with them to           
facilitate their personal, social and educational development, to enable them to           
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develop their voice, influence and place in society and to reach their full             
potential’ (Youth Work National Occupational Standards, 2012).  
At the heart of the activity of youth work is the ability of youth workers to make appropriate,                  
justifiable ethical judgements. As such it is embedded in policy and practice through the,              
previously mentioned, occupational standards, benchmarking statements and codes of         
expected conduct. My contention is that Sercombe’s framing of ‘youth work ethics’ is             
seriously flawed. In the paper I use the term ‘youth work ethics’, the title of Sercombe’s key                 
monograph, to mean the ethics that underpin the practice of youth workers/informal            
educators, rather than the ethical content of youth work’s educational agenda for young             
people.  
Sercombe’s platform is an integration of two foundations: a particular definition of youth             
work, and a particular account of what it means to be ‘a profession’. If my arguments are                 
sound then both foundations are irredeemably flawed, and the utilisation of his account of              
‘youth work ethics’ cannot but harm not only practice, but also emerging policy. At the heart                
of Sercombe’s account are, however, a few insights which do offer potential for a renewed               
framework for youth work ethics, not least his focus on youth work as based on a covenantal                 
relation of trust between youth workers and young people. This insight is, however,             
submerged and marginalized by a range of unsupported and unsupportable further claims            
about youth work and youth work practice. 
The central difficulty with Sercombe’s analysis is his desire to specify and narrowly define              
both ‘youth work’ and ‘a profession’; the latter being drawn from Koehn (1994). The result is                
that, in the case of ‘youth work’, he ends up with a series of related definitions, none of                  
which capture the everyday use of the term. In the case of ‘professions’, Sercombe (and               
Koehn) seek a level of generality which, whilst true, ignores the specific differences between              
professions. Whilst this causes no problems for Koehn’s thesis, starting as it does from the               
general agreement that medicine, law and ministry are professions, it is significant for             
Sercombe’s argument that ‘youth work’ ​ought​ to be part of the pantheon of t​he professions​.  
I begin with a consideration of Koehn’s argument and its suitability for grounding             
Sercombe’s debate. I conclude that Koehn’s thesis cannot provide the support that Sercombe             
needs. Sercombe’s argument shows that some (incomplete) account of youth work shares            
some characteristics in common with one or other of the professions. This is not, however,               
sufficient for ‘youth work’ to be identified as a profession. I then move on to consider                
Sercombe’s definition of ‘youth work’. I argue that Sercombe’s definition is both highly             
limited and only provides a purchase on ethical matters as a result of conceptual slippage in                
relation to the term ‘exclusion’. Whilst Sercombe is no doubt identifying a small sample of               
youth work practices, a much broader definition is necessary to capture the range of activities               
normally described by the term. In conclusion, I draw attention to a submerged insight in               
Sercombe’s argument; the focus on covenantal relationships of trust with young people. 
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Is Koehn a good foundation for youth work ethics? 
It is perhaps worth clarifying Koehn’s own thesis. Koehn, located in a north american              
context, is concerned with the legitimacy and authority of the ‘traditional’ professions:            
medical doctors, lawyers, and ministers of religion. The attacks on their legitimacy have             
come, she claims, from three sources. Firstly, that the professions are no more than              
ideologically constructed attempts to maintain a monopolistic approach to particular trading           
activities. Secondly, that the professions make unsupported claims to distinct ethical codes            
disassociated from ordinary morality. Thirdly, that professions ought to be legitimated by            
what they do and how effectively they do it, not by their ethical principles. Koehn argues that                 
this decline in the legitimacy of professions is important for two reasons: the professions are               
the ‘only mechanism we have for collectively providing ourselves with the goods of health,              
legal justice, and spiritual peace’ (Koehn, 1994, 5), and that they ‘...represent our             
communally ​chosen response to the problem...We could have endorsed alternative solutions           
to this problem’ (Koehn, 1994, 6). The advantage of the professions over alternatives,within             
western liberal democracies is, Koehn claims, that the ‘...professions are in some sense and to               
some degree independent of state control (Koehn, 1994, 6). Koehn’s project is then summed              
up as: 
‘..to justify trust in the practice of professionals by showing that this practice             
is in fact morally legitimate. I will argue that professional practices qualify as             
morally legitimate because, and to the extent that, they are structured to merit             
the trust of clients. Contrary to the assertions of our first set of criticism,              
professions are not mere ideologies but inherently ethical practices.         
Furthermore, each of these practices has its own special ethic, one deriving its             
particular and distinctive character from its end of engendering and preserving           
the trust of clients….While each professional ethics is not identical with           
ordinary morality, we shall see that they do not violate its dictates and             
therefore can escape the philosophers’ charge that they are immoral. Finally,           
we shall see that the descriptive versus normative distinction dear to the hearts             
of our third group of critics...cannot be sustained when one is discussing the             
practice of professions.’ (Koehn, 1994, 7-8) 
For Koehn the starting point is that there are a series of specific practices committed to                
health, legal justice and spiritual peace. She argues that these practices require a particular              
ethical relationship between the professional and their client, such that the professional both             
embraces the ethical demands of that practice and is legitimately able to act in particular               
kinds of ways in that practice. These ethical norms, whilst being consistent with ordinary              
morality nevertheless ‘bind professionals and only professionals’ (Koehn, 1994, 8). If they            
were to bind all persons then they would not be distinctive to a particular group of                
practitioners. So Koehn’s argument is that professions are legitimated by the normative            
demands placed on professionals which are ​both consistent with ordinary morality and also             
more demanding than those placed on ordinary citizens. These additional norms offer            
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confidence to both the community and the vulnerable individuals in need of their services that               
they can be trusted. They also transform at least some of the practical judgements the               
professional makes, and their consequent actions. For example, Koehn notes the issue of a              
doctor lying to a patient. Honesty is rarely ‘total truth telling’, we make judgements about               
what to say based on competing ethical norms, including not wanting to upset others,              
maintaining good relations, etc. So, my Great Aunt's new favourite hat is always ‘glorious’              
regardless of my level of aesthetic revulsion. What the doctor says to her patient is therefore                
partly informed by the ethical norms of her profession as well as ordinary ethical              
commitments to honesty. As such the practical action may not conform to the expected action               
of an ordinary citizen - the doctor may be ‘less honest’. Increasing the number of ethical                
norms does not just add ethical commitments, it changes practical judgements and            
consequent action.  
As I quoted earlier, Koehn describes professions as ‘inherently ethical practices’ (Koehn,            
1994, 7) a comment that one can read one of two ways. The first is that the professions are                   
just members of a, broader, set of ‘inherently ethical practices’, and the second is that the                
professions are coterminous with such a set. It is not, however, clear what Koehn means by                
an inherently ethical practice.  
Her argument is that the professions require trust and offer ethical commitments to the public               
at large as well as those who use their services. However, consider an example drawn from a                 
non-professional occupational group. I expect hygiene standards in my local restaurant to be             
higher than that in my own kitchen. It is not only that I think I have more of a right to ‘give’                      
food poisoning to myself and my family: it is because I am ​vulnerable in my local restaurant                 
to such risks. Unlike in my own kitchen, I do not know the provenance of the ingredients and                  
the normal practices of storage. I do not know of the illnesses that are being experienced by                 
members of the restaurant staff (and their families) like I do with my own. I need to ​trust the                   
restaurant owner. I would not, however, ascribe to her the status of a professional, and               
managing a restaurant as a ‘profession’.  
On the first reading of ‘inherently ethical practices’, the difficulty for Sercombe is that whilst               
known professions (as identified by Koehn) do in fact display these characteristics, so do a               
range of other non-professions. The claim that professions are ‘inherently ethical practices’            
seems to offer something distinct from normal ethics of everyday practices, but this is              
illusionary. There are a range of practices which differ in the ethical demands they place upon                
agents. But there is no boundary between inherently ethical practices and other practices.             
However ethically loaded Sercombe seeks to make ‘youth work’ this qualitative increase in             
ethical demands will not reach some threshold to be an ‘inherently ethical practice’. There is               
no such threshold.  
On the second reading, that ‘inherently ethical practices’ are coterminous with professions,            
given that there is no independent characterization of such practices, all that can be said is                
that professions are such practices - and no more. This reading leaves no possibility for               
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justifying another practice, for example youth work, as a profession regardless of the ethical              
commitments that it seems to require of those who are engaged in that practice.  
Further, Koehn’s claim that a professional makes a ‘public pledge’ that is ​professes their              
particular commitment to the client (Koehn, 1994, 54ff) does not do sufficient work either. It               
is characteristic of professionals that they make a public pledge ensuring their best efforts to               
do good to future clients. They do so in the presence of members of their profession and                 
request to be held accountable to it. Making a pledge to another, however, in no way                
indicates a profession. I make pledges to my wife, daughter, siblings, etc. all the time and yet                 
I do not have a professional-client relationship with any of them. Neither do I have such a                 
relationship with my students, although a range of ethical commitments and trust are             
required. Koehn’s claim is that such a pledge, a personal embracing of the particular              
commitments of one’s profession, ​legitimates the right of professional to act in the ways              
demanded by their profession. It is not that demanding such a pledge identifies a particular               
practice, for example youth work, as a profession.  
Youth work as a profession? 
Sercombe builds his case by claiming to show that youth work is not only concerned with                
ethics, but is a particular kind of ethical activity. As such, it ought to place on youth workers                  
a requirement to ​profess a particular commitment to young people. I am not convinced that               
Sercombe’s case is made even on these points, and I shall return to the definition of youth                 
work shortly. ​However​, even if this case were made then it would not be sufficient to show                 
that youth work was, or ought to be, a profession. All Sercombe has shown is that the practice                  
of youth work shares common characteristics with other practices that already have the status              
of ‘a profession’. He could easily have shown how youth work also shows characteristics in               
common with a range of other practices which are not professions. Sercombe needs more in               
order to justify his claim that youth work is a profession. 
Drawing on Koehn there would seem to be two possible routes forward for Sercombe. The               
first is either to argue that I have misrepresented Koehn’s argument on ‘inherently ethical              
practices’ or to develop this account to show that the traditional professions and youth work               
have something deeper in common; that the ‘inherently’ here is more substantive than I have               
allowed. Koehn’s use of the term, sufficient for her purposes, is relatively weak and it is                
possible to develop a stronger view, as for example I have done utilising the work of                
MacIntyre (see Davies, 2003). This stronger account of i​nherently ethical practices ​does not,             
however, give rise to a distinction between ‘professions’ and ‘non-professions’. I cannot see             
how Sercombe might reconstruct this argument in his favour.  
The second is to offer a further distinctive characteristic shared by the professions and youth               
work, such that its possession implies status as a profession. Although Koehn’s argument             
seeks to show that there are few characteristics in common that have this potential,              
nevertheless she does offer some indication in her defense of her project as a whole. She                
argues that there are two reasons why the legitimacy of the professions is important in               
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modern society, and it is these that underpin her rationale for the focus of her study. This                 
might offer a way forward. Sercombe would need to show that a suitable characteristic was               
shared by the professions and that youth work also shared this characteristic. 
Koehn’s two key reasons why the legitimacy of the professions is important, at least in North                
America, are: 
‘We should not forget that professions represent the only mechanism we have for             
collectively providing ourselves with the goods of health, legal justice, and           
spiritual peace.’ (Koehn, 1993, 5) 
‘Professions represent our communally ​chosen response to the problem of          
delivering help to the ill, the injured or accused, or the sick in spirit. We could                
have endorsed alternative solutions to the problem...Citizens of Western liberal          
democracies...have collectively prefered an arrangement in which the professions         
are in some sense and to some degree independent of state control.’ (Koehn, 1993,              
6) 
In order for Sercombe’s argument to get airborne, we need to see Koehn’s list of the goods of                  
professional practices as illustrative rather than exhaustive. Sercombe needs to argue that this             
list has some logic into which the key goods of youth work can be intelligibly added. One                 
such reading is that these goods do seem to be fundamental for our well-being. Although one                
might argue that ‘shelter providers’ are equally critical, and whilst we have professional             
builders we do not have a building profession. (We do of course need to trust the builders and                  
require of them ethical commitments.) Whilst we might read this as simply a class based               
affirmation of ‘white-collar’ activities, there are other distinctions. The particular complex           
forms of judgements made by doctors or lawyers would seem to be of a different order to                 
building a wall or even a house. Builders do make judgements, for example, getting the               
consistency of the mortar right, but after some experience one relatively easily gets a feel for                
good mortar and the stuff that will make your flemish bonding sag.  
So, the list of specific goods allied to the professions seems to be concerned primarily with                
well-being, but this does not seem to be sufficient. Space precludes a full development of this                
theme, and that it not my purpose here. Rather, ​if the list is illustrative, Sercombe needs to                 
explain, what it illustrates and how this supports youth work’s claim to be a profession. Does                
youth work, for example, require the level of complex judgements distinctive to medicine or              
law?  
The second feature that Koehn draws attention to is the singular, communally chosen             
mechanism for the provision of each of these goods. Much depends here on what might count                
as a mechanism. It is certainly true that in order to legally practice many types of medicine,                 
understood in terms of the western tradition, one needs to be a member of the medical                
profession. By this I mean that as communities (in each nation-state) we have decided that we                
will regulate certain behaviours and allow only registered professional doctors to engage in             
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them. Of course that does not restrict those who adopt an alternative form of medicine, for                
example shamans or homeopaths. The same is true of lawyers in relation to the state’s legal                
system (though not to religious courts). It is only those duly registered in a particular               
jurisdiction who can perform certain actions. We might therefore conclude that, communally,            
we have limited certain activities which are critical to the enhancement of health and legal               
justice to those who are members of particular professions. This does not of course imply that                
all vocational groups who can act in similar ways are professions, for example, nurses, or               
police officers who act in similar ways to doctors and lawyers respectively. The situation              
with ministers of religion would seem to be quite different. The differences between religious              
traditions, their acceptance and rejection of different conceptions of spiritual peace make for             
a complex picture. Rather than legal limitations, here the limitation appears to be more              
concerned with the way that we think about who are the primary practitioners in supporting               
‘the spiritual’, and they are usually religious leaders. This seems broadly correct in that if               
someone has an illness of spirit (and both I ​and they mean spirit not mind) then they would                  
be directed towards a minister of religion, presumably of the tradition which which one has               
most affinity. As Koehn points out, it could in fact be different, perhaps by redefining the                
relationship between the spiritual and the mental, or organizing religious groups differently.  
Finally, Koehn draws attention to the fact that professions, in western liberal contexts, have a               
certain independence from the state. She distinguishes this from the plethora of state             
sponsored priests in the former Soviet Union who were concerned with supporting the             
political goods of regime. Here some caution needs to be taken with context. In the UK,                
unlike the US, doctors are largely employed within a state system funded directly from              
taxation, rather than a system of private hospitals funded via the insurance of individual              
patients. In the UK the treatments and medicines available to doctors in the state health               
service are limited by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). This is a                
non-departmental government body, sponsored by, but operationally independent of, the          
government's department of health. Whilst NICE is an evidence driven organisation, central            
to this evidence is the ‘cost effectiveness’ calculation in relation to forms of treatment              
brought to its attention by government departments (see NICE, 2015). Further issues, such as              
the government control of funding and workforce planning, do indicate that any margin of              
independence, in the UK, is for the profession as a whole rather than the individual               
professional. This is primarily a concern with registration to practice, misconduct and related             
matters. This may be distinct from the US position where a marketised approach leads to               
more individual freedoms for professionals. 
Now if the legitimacy of a profession is a matter of concern for these reasons, Sercombe                
needs to show that this is the case for youth work. He needs to identify the specific                 
characteristics uniquely common to professions and youth work, and not to other            
(non-professional) practices. This he has failed to do. Not only does he not demonstrate this,               
but his account of youth work is distorted by an attempt to link youth work with the                 
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professions. It is distorted such that it neither tracks ‘reality’ nor ‘common useage’. It is to                
this matter I now turn. 
Sercombe on ‘youth work’ 
It is worth noting that in the UK, youth work does not have the trappings of a profession.                  
There is no requirement for registration, no need to make any ​‘profession of commitment’​,              
there is no misconduct body for youth work. Whilst there are ‘professionally qualifying’             
programmes of study, there is no requirement that youth workers must undertaken such             
programmes nor are pay and conditions tightly related to professional qualification. Youth            
work is funded in a range of contexts: directly by the state, by the state through                
commissioning it from other organisations and directly by charities and companies. Some of             
this is explicitly ‘youth work’, whilst some of the provision is embedded in other activities               
(such as health, or religious ministry). I have explored some of this diversity and the               
difficulties this causes for defining youth work elsewhere (see Davies, 2013).  
Sercombe’s initial definition of youth work is relatively general:  
‘Youth work is a ​professional relationship in which the young person is            
engaged as the ​primary client in their ​social context​.’ (Sercombe, 2010, 27            
emphasis in original) 
Sercombe has not proven that youth work is ‘a profession’, and what he means by a                
professional relationship is a covenantal relationship of trust between the youth worker and             
the young person. By ‘primary client’, Sercombe means that youth workers work in the best               
interests of the young person, respecting their views about what is in their interest. The term                
‘social context’ captures both the fact that the young person is part of a community of other                 
persons and that they find themselves with a particular social location typically articulated in              
terms such as class, gender, etc. Disregarding the ‘technical words’ in Sercombe’s definition,             
we can restate it as: 
Central to youth work is a covenantal relationship with a young person, in which the worker                
listens to the young person and works in the young person’s best interest, and the young                
person trusts the worker to do so. This is a particular relationship which reflects the social                
characteristics of the young person and their community. 
Whilst we might have some difficulties with this definition, it is consistent with my own               
(Davies, 2013) and does seem to capture the diverse kinds of activity that are identified as                
youth work. We could easily adapt this as a statement about a doctor or lawyer, but this does                  
not imply that youth work is a profession. So, for example, we might say of the doctor: 
Central to ​medicine is a covenantal relationship with a ​patient​, in which the ​doctor listens to                
the ​patient and works in the best interest of the ​patient’s health​, and the ​patient trusts the                 
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doctor to do so. This is a particular relationship which reflects the ​health related              
characteristics of the ​patient​. 
The key differences are that the doctor’s relationship is with a ​patient​, a distinctive title only                
applicable in healthcare rather than the more generally applicable title of ‘young person’. The              
doctor has a delineated interest, she is to focus on the patient’s health related characteristics,               
not a range of other needs. Sercombe is keen to hold onto the title of ‘client’, though it is                   
clear that only lawyers have clients, doctors have patients and ministers congregants (or             
parishioners). This does lead to an inclusion of normativity by the backdoor; terms such as               
patient, client, parishioner carry normative weight that ‘young person’ does not. Sercombe            
also seeks to offer a specific area of interest for youth workers based in a particular reading                 
of inclusion/exclusion. What I will show, however, is that whilst this reflects some aspects of               
youth work practice; it is incomplete and leads Sercombe into error.  
Secombe identifies the key feature of youth work as ‘facilitat[ing young people’s] ethical             
agency, and with their society to clear barriers of oppression and exclusion’ (Sercombe,             
2010, 5). The difficulty with this is that it either: (a) excludes, without rationale, a range of                 
activities which are presently described as youth work, or (b) offers a confused use of the                
language of exclusion, which depends on conceptual slippage across three uses of the term.              
The first use of the term is ‘purely’ descriptive, that those in the category ‘youth’ are                
excluded from certain goods and services on the grounds of their age. The second use is                
normative, that those in the category ‘youth’, are ​unfairly excluded from certain goods and              
services on the grounds of their age. The third is that some young people, members of the                 
category ‘youth’, are unfairly excluded from certain goods and services. Now it is certainly              
the case that there is a widespread belief that there are some young people who are ​unfairly                 
excluded by dint of their circumstances, for example, family poverty, school difficulties,            
being young carers, etc. Further, it is the case that a range of youth work is conducted with                  
such young people in order to overcome, or mitigate the effects of, such exclusion. What is                
more, in general in the UK, there has been broad support for such activities. Sercombe,               
however, focusses on the category ‘youth’ rather than individual young people. He asserts             
that youth are excluded and assumes that this is a problem: (a) that needs to be overcome,                 
and (b) is the distinct province of youth work.  
There are two areas in which I agree with Sercombe. The first is that some young people are                  
unfairly excluded because of particular characteristics (e.g. poverty). The second is that            
‘youth’ as a category of persons is excluded by dint of age from certain goods and services.                 
What Sercombe does not show is that this latter exclusion of a category of persons is in any                  
way unfair or unethical. Now if Sercombe is limiting youth work to work with young people                
who are unfairly excluded this is too narrow a definition of youth work. It simply excludes                
too much of the present activity described as youth work. If he wants to include all young                 
people (category ‘youth’) then more needs to be said about the role of ‘exclusion’ in his                
account of youth work. 
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Sercombe could show that there are a number of areas in which all young people are ​unfairly                 
excluded​, certainly there have been claims that the voting age ought to be lowered or that the                 
reduced funding of public transport disproportionately affects young people’s leisure time           
opportunities. We could debate and perhaps even agree some examples, but again this limits              
what will count as ‘youth work’ to these specific issues. This tracks only a small portion                
what we presently identify as youth work practices. Alternatively one could focus on the              
broader set of ‘exclusions’ which ‘youth’ as a category experience, that is focus on both ​fair                
and unfair forms of exclusion. What then is the range of ​fair exclusions? They surely relate                
to those aspects of life and practice which are deemed to be the remit ​only of adult citizens.                  
As such youth workers may work with young people in order that they, in time, will be able                  
to take their place as adults within their communities, or to put it more simply, support them                 
to grow up. On this reading of ‘youth’ being fairly excluded, the focus of youth work                
becomes ‘upbringing’ which was my own frame for defining the diverse scope of actual              
youth work practice (Davies, 2013). As with the case of the use of ‘client’ as opposed to                 
‘young person’, Sercombe has smuggled in normative content by assuming that exclusion is             
always unfair.  
Sercombe’s definition of youth work is therefore unsubstantiated. Deconstructing his          
argument shows that, at best, youth work is concerned with young person and youth worker               
trusting each other as they seek, in the young person’s interest, to enable that young person                
both to take their place as an adult member of their community and oppose unfair forms of                 
exclusion . Whilst such a definition needs further defense and refinement it does include             1
much of the work presently conducted under the title in the UK. It does not, however, do                 
sufficient work for Sercombe. Let us return to my earlier development of Koehn’s account of               
why her project was important. Professions are concerned with significant specific goods,            
delivered through a single communally agree mechanism which ought, in a western liberal             
society, to have some independence from the state. It is not obvious from the discussion of                
Koehn on this point, or of Sercombe in relation to youth work, that youth work reflects the                 
structure of the traditional professions.  
If not a profession, then what? 
Sercombe’s account of youth work ethics has become influential in the UK, and as such is                
deserving of further analysis. It plays to a gallery that believes that youth work ​ought to be a                  
profession. I have not shown that there are no foundation for such a claim, but rather                
Sercombe’s argument does not bear the weight. Koehn’s analysis of established professions            
and how they achieve their legitimacy is unsuited for a task of supporting youth work’s claim                
to professional status. What is more important, Sercombe’s attempt to utilise Koehn distorts             
the definition of youth work, and of youth work ethics. We are left, in the latter half of the                   
book, with a series of claims about how youth workers ought to behave which lack any                
1 ​Though the term exclusion, though utilised by Sercombe,  might be unhelpful. It is absent from occupational 
standards where minor reference to promotion of equality (CLD, 2008, 11) or tackling barriers to participation, 
(CLD, 2008,, 60) amongst a range of other values and competencies is prefered.  
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reasonable foundations. However, at the centre of Sercombe’s narrative, which he under            
utilises, is a kernel which offers potential for a defensible ethics which reflects the diversity               
of youth work activities.  
Sercombe notes (rather than argues) that youth work is based on a particular kind of               
covenantal relationship of trust between worker and young person. This obviously reflects            
his interest in Koehn’s work. As I noted earlier the fact that professions have this general                
characteristic in no way implies that all practices which also show this characteristic are              
professions. In fact, however, this kind of relationship does seem to capture an essential              
feature of youth work practice. By covenantal relationship we are distinguishing it from one              
grounded in contractual relationships. In contractual relationships we agree to act together in             
order that we both gain some good we desire. For example, we agree to an exchange of                 
goods (buying and selling), or the way we will divide up the proceeds of our joint labours. It                  
is a relationship which is loosely ‘pre-scripted’; if you do X then you will receive Y.                
Covenantal relationships, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with the quality of the              
relationship, and it is from such qualities that goods emerge. Sacks (2008) states the              
difference in the  following way: 
‘What is a covenant? A covenant is not a contract. A contract is made for a                
limited period, for a specific purpose, between two or more parties, each seeking             
their own benefit. A covenant is made open-endedly by two or more parties who              
come together in a bond of loyalty and trust to achieve together what none can               
achieve alone. A contract is like a deal; a covenant is like a marriage. Contracts               
belong to the market and to the state, to economics and politics, both of which are                
arenas of competition. Covenants belong to families, communities, charities,         
which are arenas of cooperation. A contract is between me and you – separate              
selves – but a covenant is about us – collective belonging. A contract is about               
interests; a covenant is about identity.’ 
In fact under Sacks’ account we just need to say that it is a covenantal relationship, trust and                  
loyalty are ‘built in’ to the definition. It emerges from a longer term commitment to each                
other. As Kolodny (2010) points out the characteristics of a relationship emerge from the              
characteristics of the experiences that, over time, compose that relationship. Thus individual            
interactions between a youth worker and young people reflect the characteristics of such a              
covenantal relationship.  
What is central to the ethics of youth work, is not a profession, but a particular kind of                  
relationship emerging over time, between young people and particular adults, all embedded            
in the same social milieu: families and communities. The relationship is not concerned with              
the exchange of money for services, but collaborative acts with those with whom they ‘are               
relationally close’. The discourse of the professional militates against such a view, not only              
by advocating ‘professional detachment’, but more importantly by prioritising the          
‘community’ of practitioners over the communities of adults and young people of which             
those practitioners ought to be part. It is, of course, perfectly consistent with this position that                
a youth worker receive payment, in the form of a ‘stipend’ or ‘living’ from the community in                 
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order to be freed from having to earn a living elsewhere. But such a living is not for services,                   
but rather an expression of value of their work as a member of, and on behalf of, the wider                   
community.  
Conclusion 
Education has long been held to be an ethical activity, and particularly so when conducted               
informally as in youth work. As the UK framework on occupational standards, higher             
education benchmarks and codes of conduct make clear youth work requires from workers             
ethical understanding and commitment to ethical practice. Sercombe’s text on youth work            
ethics has become seminal in UK based discussions about the ethical practice of youth              
workers. In this paper I have argued that his argument is unmade and that practitioners,               
policymakers and educators would be wise to distance themselves from it. His arguments,             
drawn from Koehn, are insufficient and combined with an unrealistic definition of youth             
work, offer a distorted and unhelpful framework for ethical practice. There may be a case for                
seeing youth work as a profession, but Sercombe’s argument does not provide it. In fact,               
there is a good reason to be suspicious of identifying youth work as a profession. Sercombe’s                
identification of covenantal relationships of trust as at the heart of youth work practice leads               
one away from such a conclusion. 
If covenantal relationships offer a core to youth work practice ​and youth work ethics then the                
direction of travel ought to be away from a profession of youth work. The core community is                 
not one of practitioners, but of families and young people; communities of which the youth               
worker is a part. In this paper I have focused on the foundations of Sercombe’s argument, if                 
goes without saying that if the foundations are wrong then his later arguments for particular               
ethical behaviours also fall.  
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